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Abstract 
Since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the large current account surpluses in some countries have 
become an important topic of discussion in international fora. In this paper, we empir-ically assess the 
factors that could potentially explain the persistence of global imbalances in selected advanced and 
emerging countries. We adopt a panel-regression approach on a sample covering 56 countries, allowing 
us to assess the medium-term determinants of current accounts. First, we perform benchmark 
estimations and break down our estimations between pre- and post- GFC samples using two different 
approaches. Second, we specify more comprehensive models in order to better understand current 
account dynamics. Our results show that the GFC did not imply any structural break in the 
determination of current accounts. Moreover, financial development, openness, and institutional 
variables appear as the main factors impacting cur-rent account dynamics through the effects that they 
have on investment and saving behaviors. Finally, we use our estimates to predict the equilibrium 
current accounts and compute the con-tribution of underlying factors. Despite some uncertainty 
around the estimates, our models are able to explain most of the observed current account 
configuration, showing only some excess surplus compared to equilibrium in the case of China and 
more recently Germany. In the case of the U.S., however, larger uncertainty ranges prevent us from 
precisely estimating equilibrium current account levels.
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1 Introduction
Since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), issues related to global imbalances have attracted increasing
attention in the public policy debate. For instance, discussions at the G20 summit in 2019 showed a
renewed interest by policy leaders on the subject, while it was largely absent in the aftermath of the
GFC. The IMF (2017) External Sector Report identified 40 episodes of current account surpluses and 70
episodes of current account deficits since 1960. Before the GFC, deficits were mainly concentrated in the
U.S. and were financed by surpluses in China, oil-exporting countries, and other emerging economies.
While deficits and surpluses can be explained by cross-country differences in key structural factors, the
main question concerned the size and the dynamics of the current account imbalances. In the U.S., for
instance, the current account deficit was approximately six percent of GDP in 2006, while it was at 1.5
percent of GDP in the early 1990s. In 1977, China’s current account surplus was 3.8 percent of GDP and
reached 9.9 percent of GDP in 2007 at the eve of the GFC. In developing countries, the aggregate current
account balance had already moved into surpluses in the early 2000s, well before the GFC, and increased
to record levels in 2006. The GFC led to abrupt adjustments in global imbalances. Deficit countries
reduced their current account imbalances owing mainly to a contraction in imports. Concerning surplus
countries, the slowdown in international trade following the crisis led to less buoyant exports, and their
current account surpluses declined. However, this adjustment implied some changes in the configuration
of global imbalances. Indeed, since the GFC, the surpluses have been mainly concentrated in Northern
European countries and some emerging and oil-exporting countries. In Europe, Germany is running
the largest current account surplus and has become the main surplus country at the global level. Policy
makers and academics explain the persistence of German surpluses by structural factors that created a
gap in productivity between the manufacturing and service sectors (Coricelli et al., 2013). As shown by
Figure 1, the German surpluses increased mainly after the Asian crisis of 1998. From 2000 to 2014, the
current account surpluses are mainly concentrated in emerging market and developing countries. We can
also observe the plummet of oil and natural gas prices that led the current accounts of these countries into
deficit. It should be noted that the surpluses in emerging countries are driven by oil-exporting countries.
Combining German and Japanese current accounts, these two countries have accounted for larger current
account surpluses since 2014 than those of China and emerging/developing economies combined. In
2018, the current account surplus in China declined to 0.019 percent of World GDP, while the German
current accounts remained at high levels of 0.23 percent of World GDP, moderating somewhat after
reaching its record level in 2015 (0.29 percent). At the same time, the U.S. current accounts were still in
deficit since 1992, with a record of -1.1 percent of World GDP in 2005.
Going forward, current accounts are projected to increase marginally according to the IMF(International
Monetary Fund) WEO (World Economic Outlook) released after the Covid-19 crisis in April 2020. The
German surplus is expected to remain close to seven percent of GDP, while the U.S. deficit is projected
to deteriorate further to 2.8 percent of GDP in 2021. In its External Assessment Report, the IMF (2019)
suggested that approximately 35–45 percent of current account surpluses and deficits were assessed to
be excessive. The IMF pointed to higher-than-warranted surpluses in some euro area countries, such
as Germany and the Netherlands, as well as Korea and Singapore. On the deficit side, the imbalances
remained concentrated in the United Kingdom and the U.S. By contrast, China’s external position was
assessed to be in line with fundamentals.
Against this background, our paper aims at understanding the reasons of the persistence of global im-
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balances and the rotation of surpluses since the GFC from China to North European countries. We adopt
an empirical approach based on that used in Chinn and Prasad (2003). First, we run several models using
traditional current account determinants, including fiscal balance, net foreign assets, income per capita,
GDP growth, financial crisis, trade openness, youth age, and old age dependence ratios. Our database
covers advanced and emerging countries. We find that fiscal balance impacts the current accounts posi-
tively, i.e., as usually found in the literature assessing the current account determinants. However, when
we break down our sample by income levels, this impact disappears in the advanced market subsam-
ple. The basic estimation shows the impact of the per capita income and the population ratios depends
on the sample of countries. After these basic estimations, we decompose our sample between pre- and
post-GFC periods. This decomposition allows us to emphasize that current account dynamics are not
only different across countries but also across time. We also use another approach based on dummies
variables. However, the use of Chow tests to check for the presence of structural breaks does not show
any evidence of the GFC as an important structural change in current account dynamics. Following
this first set of results, we specify more comprehensive models to improve our understanding of current
account dynamics across countries and over time. In particular, we include the role of financial develop-
ment, currency misalignment, financial openness, and institution quality variables in explaining current
account developments and differences across countries. Our results show that financial development,
financial openness, and institutions variables are significant factors impacting current account determi-
nation through the change in investment and saving behaviors. Finally, we use our estimates to predict
current accounts for selected countries and compute the contribution of the underlying factors. In most
cases, our models are able to explain most of the current account configuration. In the aftermath of the
GFC, surpluses in China were mainly explained by demographic determinants and trade openness, while
in Germany income factors (GDP per capita) remain the main factor explaining the excess of savings.
While the surplus observed in the past years show a convergence of the Chinese current accounts to-
wards its equilibrium levels, it remains higher than our predictions in the case of Germany, implying
some relative signs of disequilibrium. For deficit countries, our models show more difficulty in tracking
the current account dynamics of the U.S., with large uncertainty around the estimates. In any case, the
observed current accounts remain at the lower part of our estimates and are only explained by the high
development level of the U.S. financial system.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some brief review of the literature. Section
3 gives an overview of the determinants of the current accounts. Section 4 sheds light on details about
the empirical methodology and data. Section 5 reports and comments our empirical results. Section 6
presents some concluding remarks.
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Figure 1 – Global Current Account (as a percentage of world GDP) (Data source: IMF)
2 Literature review
Oliveira-Martins and Plihon (1992) analyzed the history of current account imbalances through three
different periods, representing the various stages of global economic developments. From 1967 to 1973,
the configuration of current accounts at the global level was characterized by large surpluses in indus-
trialized countries, financing the deficits of peripheral countries. The second stage concerned the period
from 1974 to 1982. This period was characterized by “South-South” imbalances, with oil-producing
countries using their surpluses to finance developing economies through the banking systems of ad-
vanced economies. The third stage concerned “North-North” imbalances, with the United States(the
U.S) deficit being financed by European countries and Japan. While the analysis of Oliveira-Martins and
Plihon (1992) is dated, we can observe that the current configuration of global imbalances still involves
U.S. deficits being financed by European countries and Japan. In the meantime, it is worth pointing out
that China has become a key player in current account developments at the global level, being the main
surplus country financing the U.S. deficit in the pre-GFC period. In recent years, however, while the U.S.
current accounts have remained in deficit, a rotation in the composition of surplus countries has been ob-
served. While the current account surpluses continued to shrink in China and oil exporting countries,
the Northern European surplus countries, including Germany, have registered sustained current account
surpluses.
Theoretically, Sachs et al. (1981) was among the first to provide an analysis of global current account
imbalances through the intertemporal approach. This first contribution was then extended by Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1984), Milesi-Ferrett and Razin (1996) and Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998). In this ap-
proach, the current accounts reflect saving-investment choices at the global level, which rely on the
equality of current consumption to the share of the present discounted value of future expected net in-
come (or net assets). Hence, any shock that leads to a change in current consumption will imply a change
in current accounts. Such shocks can be related to either change in interest rates or in expectations of
future income due to productivity shocks or government policies (Chinn et al., 2014). This approach has
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proved useful to provide various determinants for explaining current account determination at a country
level (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). However, explaining current accounts at the global level also needs
to assess whether the global configuration reflects equilibrium conditions or imbalances that need to be
corrected.
Global current account configurations represent equilibrium conditions only if their determinants
are self-sustained. For instance, Caballero et al. (2008) explain that the lack of financial development
in emerging economies (shown by underdeveloped financial markets or by financial crises) created a
“global saving glut” (Bernanke, 2005; Clarida, 2005) spurring capital flows from underdeveloped finan-
cial system to world financial centers (Chinn and Ito, 2019). This view of current accounts led to the
“safe asset” argument used by commentators of the U.S. current account deficit. Hence, continuous flows
from emerging economies to the U.S. would allow a sustainable financing of the U.S. current account
deficits. By contrast, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009), Gourinchas and Rey
(2007) and Blanchard et al. (2005) advance that real and financial adjustments are necessary because of
unsustainable net foreign asset positions at the global level. With a general equilibrium model, Obstfeld
and Rogoff (2005) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2007) show that a reversal of the U.S. current accounts
would lead to a significant depreciation of the real effective exchange rate, with severe consequences for
economic growth. However, the link between current accounts and exchange rate movements is ambigu-
ous. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) argue that current account imbalances are not related to exchange
rate misalignment but are the consequence of imbalances between savings and investment. As a result,
misalignment would be an indicator but not the root cause of external imbalances.
The determinants of current accounts have also led to an abundant empirical literature (see Chinn and
Ito, 2005, 2007; Chinn and Prasad, 2003). For instance, Chinn and Prasad (2003) provide an empirical
assessment of the determinants of current accounts in industrialized and developing countries and find
a positive relationship between the current account and the fiscal balance. This finding is confirmed by
Chinn and Ito (2007) for industrialized countries and the U.S. Within developing countries, they find
a positive impact of financial deepening on the current accounts, while trade openness has a negative
impact. Gruber and Kamin (2007) fail to explain the U.S current account deficit but find better results
for Asian surplus countries once taking into account the impact of previous financial crises. A part of the
empirical literature has also focused on the dynamics of current account adjustments among industrial
countries. For instance, Freund (2005) find that reversals of current accounts are associated with 10-
20 percent real exchange rate depreciation. Assessing the role of exchange rates in current account
persistence, Gnimassoun and Mignon (2015) show that current account imbalances among industrialized
countries are due to exchange rate misalignment. Arghyrou and Chortareas (2008) also find significant
relationships between the current accounts and the real exchange rate while examining the link between
current account adjustments and effective exchange rates for the euro zone.
Overall, the literature remains mostly inconclusive with regard to the fundamental drivers of global
current account imbalances. On the one hand, structural factors that drive disequilibria between savings
and investment seem fundamental, including demographic trends and productivity developments. On
the other hand, policy and institutional factors, such as fiscal and exchange rate policies, openness to
trade, and financial market developments, are also likely to explain a large part of the current account
configuration at the global level.
5
3 Model and data
3.1 Methodology
To understand the relationship between current account balance and its determinants, we use a panel
data model. Our estimation strategy is mainly inspired by the approach in Chinn and Prasad (2003) and
Gruber and Kamin (2007). We run a fixed-effects model taking into account cross-sectional dependence.
Instead of constructing multiyear averages of annual observations as in Chinn and Prasad (2003) and
Gruber and Kamin (2007), we use an unbalanced panel data covering the period 2000 to 2015 with 56
advanced and emerging countries. In our study, the current accounts—expressed as a share of GDP—
serve as our dependent variable.
The econometric specification used is as follows:
Yit = α0 + α1Xit + uit
Where i and t are respectively the country index and the time index. The variable Y represents
our dependent variable and X represents our independent variables, which are briefly reviewed below.
Apart from the classic methodology on fixed effects (as shown in the table 18), the particularities of
this study come from the cross-sectional dependence. Indeed, in our study we take into account the
cross-sectional dependence that may occur in a simple fixed-effects analysis using the test proposed by
De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006). Following the approach described in Baltagi (2012), we find the presence
of an autoregressive order one process. To correct problems that may occur, we use a panel-corrected
standard error estimation proposed by Blackwell III (2005).
3.2 Data
There are numerous empirical studies that have researched the determinants of current account imbal-
ances, allowing us to include some common variables used in the literature. These variables are net
foreign assets, oil dependency, trade openness, fiscal policy, the stage of economic development, insti-
tutional variables, financial, economic crisis, exchange rate, and demographic variables. The impact of
these variables on current accounts differ across empirical strategies used and across countries. Follow-
ing the theoretical discussion, we include in our exercise variables such as GDP per capita (source: world
economic outlook database of IMF 2); population variables composed of age dependence ratios (source:
WDI3). From the same database (WDI4) we have extracted the trade openness variable. Data of finan-
cial development come from the Financial Development Index database of the IMF 5. The other control
variables include currency misalignment (source: CEPII, 2017)6, net foreign assets (source: Lane and
Milesi-Ferrett, 2017), real exchange rates (source: BRUEGEL, 2020), total factor productivity variable





6Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales
7https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/?lang=en
8http : //web.pdx.edu/ ito/Chinn− Itowebsite.htm
9International Country Risk Guide
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For the financial crisis indicator used in this paper, we construct our own variable based on past financial
crises, which is constructed using different databases of major financial crises that our sample countries
experienced. Information regarding the economic and financial crises of advanced countries come from
the Macrohistory Database of Jordà (2016). Emerging countries’ data come from the IMF database. Us-
ing the dates of financial crises, we build a crisis dummy variable as our financial crisis indicator. It takes
the value one if a country is in crisis and zero otherwise. To reduce the influence of the dummy variable
when dealing with common crises, we construct a new crisis variable using the method employed by
Gruber and Kamin (2007). We transform our crisis dummy into a relative measure. We thus calculate a
weighted average of the GDP per capita of the crisis dummy. Then, we correct this value of the initial
value to obtain the new crisis variable.
4 Results
4.1 Data snapshot
Before starting the interpretation of our results, we provide a brief snapshot of our data. Note that our
period of study ranges from 2000 to 2015. Before our regressions, we drop some outlier countries such
as Singapore and countries that have many missing data. A quick analysis shows that during our study
period, the maximum value comes from Malaysia in 2008. The minimum value comes from Bulgaria
in 2008. On average over our study period, countries run current account deficits. A grouped snapshot
between advanced and emerging countries separately shows us some interesting findings. On average,
even in advanced or emerging countries, the current accounts are in deficit over the period (the mean
indicates -0.06750 for advanced countries and -1.275 for developing countries (see Table 9 and Table
10))
4.2 Estimation results
Table 1 presents our econometric estimations for several traditional current account determinants. The
model is estimated with an initial sample of 56 countries.
The first three models are testing some traditional variables (fiscal balance, demographic factors, net
foreign assets, GDP per capita, GDP growth, real exchange rate, trade and financial openness). In the
second model, we add our economic crisis variable, and in the third model, we test the impact of the
interactive variable of economic crisis and trade openness. The first row for each variable in our tables
shows the estimated coefficients, and the second row indicates value of the t-statistic. The stars close to
the estimated coefficients indicate the level of significance of our variables.
The results of the first three models give us estimated coefficients with expected signs. Current
account surpluses are associated with higher levels of per capita income, fiscal balance, and youth age
ratio (or youth dependence ratio). The positive impact of the youth dependence ratio agrees with the life
cycle theory. A higher youth dependence ratio should exert a positive impact on the current account by
increasing the share of savers in the population. In our context, we can say the youth age ratio is driven
more by the working age population. This can be true for the general model, but not for all types of
economies. The results of emerging market estimation show that an increase in the youth dependence
ratio is associated with current account deficits (as in Gruber and Kamin (2007)). The contradiction in
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this result compared to the previous models may be because the youth dependence ratio is driven in these
economies by birth rates. The high birth rate and the high rate of the youth dependence ratio leads to a
high share of nonsavers, which should exert a negative impact on the current account.
Concerning the old age ratio (old dependence ratio), it does not appear significantly in our general
models. However, when separately considering advanced and emerging economies, we notice that it has
opposite signs between the two samples. In emerging markets, the old age ratio is negatively associated
with the current accounts. This result is consistent with the life-cycle model, which suggests a higher
old age dependence ratio should lead to a lower current account. It is a consequence of the higher share
of consumers or borrowers relative to savers (The IMF (2017) External Sector Report). In advanced
economies, the positive impact can be interpreted as a problem in terms of public policy to encourage
consumption. It can also be a consequence of uncertainty, with consumers preferring to save their money
rather than spending it. We can also interpret it as solidarity between old and youth generations. The
older generation may be concerned about the future of their children or grandchildren so that they reduce
their consumption and continue saving in order to help the younger generation face eventual economic
problems.
Another finding of this first set of estimation results concerns the role of the real exchange rate.
In emerging markets, an appreciation of their currency leads to a lower current account balance. The
appreciation makes imports cheaper and exports more expensive, leading to a deterioration in the trade
balance. Higher trade openness is associated with surpluses in current accounts in advanced countries, as
shown in Model 6 (column 6) of Table 1. This result can also provide information about the impact of a
country’s integration into global value chains. The more a country is integrated into global value chains,
the more the country registers surpluses in their current account.
Concerning the fiscal balance variable, our estimated coefficients are significant and greater than
those estimated by Gruber and Kamin (2007), Chinn and Prasad (2003) and Bussière et al. (2005). The
value ranges (for significant values) from 0.194 to 0.232. An increase in the budget balance leads to
current account surpluses. Following the current account and budget balance relation described above,
this result confirms the twin deficit hypothesis. In an economy where economic agents are not fully
Ricardian, the fiscal balance (either through tax reductions or increases in spending) could lead to trade
deficits and current account deficits. This positive relationship between the fiscal balance variable and
the current account appears in five out of six of our models, unambiguously confirming that agents are
not fully Ricardian. In this general model, GDP growth significantly impacts the current account, with a
negative sign. An increase in GDP growth therefore leads to a deterioration in the current account. Our
coefficients are highly significant and higher than those in Gruber and Kamin (2007). This result could be
due to our estimation approach. The value and sign are, however, consistent with the estimation results
in Chinn and Prasad (2003) and Chinn and Ito (2005). The impact of per capita income on the current
account is different whether we consider emerging markets or advanced economies. Even if the impact
is significant for all models, in emerging markets, it is negatively associated with the current account,
while it is positively associated in advanced economies. These results confirm the role of economic
convergence in current account dynamics for fast-growing economies.
Turning to the financial crisis indicator, we find that it positively impacts the current account. This
impact can be due to policies set in countries during the crisis period. We have tried to understand the
impact of future crises by introducing a crisis variable, which is calculated by considering the financial
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crisis variable one-year ahead to compute the current year estimation (model 2.1 in table 1). A future
crisis occurrence appears to lead current accounts into deficits. In a perspective to prevent a future crisis,
countries would implement expansionary fiscal policies to safeguard their economy. These measures will
generate public deficit and hence current account deficit.
Our results concerning the financial openness variable show that in surpluses countries, excess cap-
ital mobility could lead to current account reversal, while in deficit countries, an excess capital mobility
may worsen external accounts. We can also notice, at least regarding advanced countries, that the com-
bined effect of trade openness and financial crisis is associated with current account deficits, while trade
openness only affects the current accounts positively.
Overall, this first set of results confirms the role of the traditional determinants of current accounts
while showing different effects depending on the type of countries considered.
4.3 Estimation before and after the GFC
4.3.1 The sample division approach
To better understand the impact of our results, we conduct another set of estimations dividing our regres-
sion period into two subsamples. The first period is the years before the GFC (from 2000 to 2008), and
the second period is the years after the GFC (from 2008 to 2015). As above, we distinguish—in addition
to a whole sample model—separate models for emerging and for advanced economies.
Table 2 shows estimations of the general model using model 3 of our first estimation table. Compar-
ing the first and the second columns, we find noticeable differences for some variables, such as the real
exchange rate, old age ratio, and net foreign assets. Net foreign assets appear to play a significant role
even before or after the GFC. However, in the subdivided sample, its role is not the same as before and
after the GFC. In emerging countries, it does not play any significant and positive role before the GFC,
while it does after the GFC. In advanced countries, we find the opposite results. It has a significant and
positive impact on the current account before the GFC and no significant impact after the GFC. However,
this overall result hides differences between emerging markets and advanced economies. Concerning the
old age ratio, we notice that it affects countries differently in the two considered subsamples. Before
the GFC, it implies lower current accounts. This result can be explained by the fact that there will be
economies with a higher share of consumers, or possibly borrowers, than savers (IMF, 2017, External
Sector Report). The impact after the crisis is negative and contrary to the previous impact. This finding
can be explained as the psychological side of a recent financial crisis among elders. Indeed, increased
uncertainty following the GFC can be a potential factor. Instead of spending their savings, elders appear
to prefer accumulation of their income to eventually bequest.
We also find that the real exchange rate does not play the same role before and after the GFC. Before
the GFC, the real exchange rate contributes to the current account deficit, while after the GFC, the real
exchange rate leads to current account surpluses. The financial openness effects remain the same before
or after the GFC. Financial openness impacts the current accounts significantly and with the same sign
as in Table 1. However, in emerging countries, its impact is significant only after the GFC, while in
advanced countries, it is significant only before the GFC. The financial crisis and the interaction variable
between trade openness and financial crisis are significant only in advanced economies and in the pre-
crisis model. The first contributes to a negative current account, while the second leads to a positive
current account. In emerging markets, net foreign assets and financial openness only impact the current
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accounts in the post-GFC model, contrary to advanced economies where it impacts only in the pre-crisis
model.
The GDP per capita impact plays a major role only in the pre-crisis model in emerging markets,
while it plays an important role both in pre- and post-crisis models for advanced economies. In the first
type of economies, it decreases the current accounts, and in the second category, it increases the current
account positions.
Another interesting observation concerns the role of the fiscal balance before and after the GFC.
Our model indicates that before the GFC, fiscal variables do not have a significant impact on the current
accounts, while it does after the GFC, regardless of which group of countries is considered. The sign
is positive as in Table 1. The fiscal balance variable plays the same role in post-crisis models for both
emerging and advanced economies.
4.3.2 The dummy variable approach
As describe above the first approach help to understand the dynamic of the current accounts before and
after the GFC, but it leads us to observation loosing. We complete the analysis with another approach.
Indeed, to prevent from losing observation, we conduct a second approach based on dummy variable.
We first create dummy variable for periods before and after the GFC. We then interact our main variables
with the dummies as the table 4 shows. We create also dummy variable for every single year and also
specially for the years 2007 and 2008 which are the year of the beginning of the GFC. The estimation
using the dummy of the the year 2008 give an expected result about the negative impact of the GFC
(which occurs in year 2008) on the current accounts. It leads countries into deficit and also reduce the
surpluses by public spending as response to the crisis. Detailing our results (table 4), we realize that they
are not so different from the previous approach. The fiscal balance variable still positive and significative
after the GFC. This approach shows us that the GDP per capita is only significative before the GFC
and the GDP growth only after the GFC. Concerning the financial crisis variable, the general estimation
(table 3) shows that it impacts positively and significantly the current accounts. Table 4 reveals that the
impact of the financial crisis is not the same whether we are before or after the GFC situations. In the
first case, it has negative impact while in the second it leads to positive impact.
Despite apparent differences in coefficients between the pre- and post-crisis period, we need to check
whether such differences are statistically significant or, in other words, whether the GFC has implied
structural changes between the current accounts and its traditional determinants. To do so, we perform
Chow tests to verify whether coefficients are different according to the various samples considered. These
test results are presented in the annexes. The results fail to reject the hypothesis of no structural break.
Hence, the GFC does not appear to play an important role in the current account determination. As these
determinants are structural, they incorporate changes that the crisis could have brought about. Regarding
these facts, the rest of our regression models discussed are on the general model. We do not comment
further on the results before and after the GFC, but we present these results in the annexes for further
information (Table 7 and Table 8).
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4.4 Financial development, currency misalignment, institutional quality, financial open-
ness and current accounts
To improve the ability of our model to better explain global imbalances, we introduce additional variables
in order to capture the financial development, exchange rate policy, and quality of institutions. The results
are reported in Table 5. Except for in model 2, financial development does not significantly impact
current accounts. The negative impact can be interpreted as a consequence of financial development on
saving behaviors. Indeed, financial development eases the access to capital for financing investment and
allows an increase in capital inflows into countries. A country with a better financial system is associated
with less risk and less information costs to obtain credit from banks. The cumulating effects of financial
development and financial openness reduce the savings rate and thus increase investment. The increase
in investment tends to reduce the current account and then increase deficits. Our results are therefore
consistent with prior work regarding the role of financial development in explaining current accounts
(Chinn and Ito, 2005). In their study, Gruber and Kamin (2007) also found negative impacts, but they
were not significant.
The currency misalignment appears to increase deficits of the current accounts over our sample.
When the gap between the real exchange rate and its equilibrium level is high, it leads the current account
into a deficit position. Referring to the definition that we gave above on currency misalignment, it appears
that an overvaluation of the currency leads to current account deficit. These results are consistent with
the work conducted by Gnimassoun and Mignon (2015) concerning industrialized countries.
Among the institutional variables, we notice that the ability of governments to implement declared
programs (government stability variable) is a factor that improves the current accounts. In particular, in
some North European countries, social and religious factors were used to explain the capacity of their
government to respect or implement their declared programs over time (Weber, 1904; Arruñada Benito,
2010; Becker and Woessmann, 2009; Cantoni et al., 2017). Corruption as an institutional variable, mak-
ing public policies inefficient, allows financial illicit flows among countries and then negatively impacts
the current accounts. It can also represent a source of political instability in a country. This variable has
negative impacts on the current accounts in our model results. However, it is important to notice that
this impact can vary depending on the countries considered. Concerning the investment profile, in the
presence of high-risk investment, the current account balance tends to deteriorate.
In the same vein as the financial development variable, the financial openness indicator contributes
to current account deficits, as it allows capital movement among countries and then increases investment
in countries that can attract capital flows. These countries are those with better financial sectors, and as
mentioned above, countries with investment needs run deficits of their current account, explaining the
negative signs associated with this variable in our results.
4.5 Robustness check
To check the robustness of our findings, we perform a system-GMM (Generalized Method of Moments)
estimation using the same models used in Table 5. This method allows us to deal with the problem of
endogeneity that may occur between current accounts and the fiscal balance variable. The results are
represented in Table 6. The Hansen test and Arrellano-Bond for AR(2) do not allow us to reject the
hypothesis of non-validity of our lagged variables as instruments in level or in difference. The effects
for most of our variables are confirmed. Fiscal balance, GDP per capita, GDP growth financial crisis,
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and some institutional variables have the same impact in terms of sign on the current accounts. One
important observation that we make from these estimations is the role of the lagged current accounts.
The situation of the current accounts in the previous year positively impact the current position of the
current accounts.
4.6 Model uncertainty and assessment of current account equilibrium levels for selected
economies
Before analyzing the contributions of the different variables to current account dynamics, we test the
overall consistency of the various models presented above. The different models estimated allow us to
make current account predictions or estimations of their equilibrium levels, i.e., the current accounts that
would be determined by the various fundamental variables considered. As the models include differ-
ent combinations of variables, this section gives a summary of these predictions for selected countries.
These predictions allow us to check whether the actual current accounts are in line or not with their
fundamentals and give us an account of model uncertainty around these predictions.
The method is based on our current account equilibrium prediction derived from our 13 different
models. As the predictions are different, we want to see how close these results are to each other. Hence,
we compute the mean prediction as well as deviations around this mean 10. We then obtain the following
graphs. The graphs in Figure. 2 show the predictions of our models are consistent for all selected
countries except the U.S. These graphs are useful to illustrate the extent of model uncertainty around our
predictions. Hence, the tighter the range around the prediction, the lower the model uncertainty. Model
uncertainty is low in the case of Germany and China (Graphs in Figure 2). For Germany, the predictions
point to structural surpluses in the current accounts of approximately four to six percent of GDP. This
result shows that the current levels of German current accounts are therefore above the predictions. They
are even above the upper bound of our uncertainty range, pointing to an excessive surplus compared
to fundamentals. Concerning China, our models point to current accounts close to balance or in slight
deficits. Hence, the strong current account surpluses registered before the GFC appears as clear external
imbalances. The recent decline in surpluses is therefore in line with fundamentals as predicted by our
models.
For France and Japan, our models point to structural current account deficits of approximately zero to
two percent at the end of the period. While the French current account is currently within the range, the
Japanese current account remains clearly out of range, as none of our models predict a current account
surplus. In the two euro zone countries, we can also add that our results justify the adoption of The
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure in 201111.
Finally, the U.S. case remains largely inconclusive. While the mean is approximately zero, the pre-
dictions of our models range from surpluses of approximately four percent of GDP to deficits of approxi-
mately two percent of GDP. However, the actual level of the U.S. current accounts appears slightly below
the lower bound of our wide range, indicating that a current account deficit of more than two percent can
be considered excessive. However, these results also indicate that the explanatory variables used in our
models may not be the most appropriate in the case of the U.S.






Figure 2 – Estimates of current account equilibrium levels and model uncertainty
4.7 Decomposition of model predictions
Based on models 1 and 4, shown in Table 5, predicted current accounts are computed and compared with
observed current accounts. Both variables are represented as lines in our graphics. We also derive our
estimates from the contribution of each explanatory variable by multiplying their estimated coefficient
by their observations, also accounting for country fixed effects. In our graphs, the contributions of our
explanatory variables are represented as bars. We group together the effects of youth and old dependency
age ratio into a single variable (named "population factors"). The effects of financial crises, financial
development, and its interaction variable are grouped together into "financial factors". Other variables are
also categorized into GDP variables, openness variables, exchange rate variables, institution variables,
and the productivity variable (Figure 3 and Figure 4).
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4.7.1 Which role of saving and investments?
Figure 3, which represents model 1, shows total factor productivity, openness variables, and population
factors are the main drivers of the current account positions in our selected countries. We can thus say that
saving and investment factors are the main drivers of the current account predictions. On the saving side,
demographic factors can be mentioned, along with productivity and openness on the investment side.
The component "Other" also represents a large share in the predictions. This share can include some
specific characteristics of these countries. In this context, we have tried to understand which components
are included in the variable "Other". We conduct our analysis by looking at the role of exchange rate and
institutional factors. As mentioned above, exchange rate factors can play a large role and contribute to a
significant part of the change in current accounts when these variables are added. These indicators could
also explain whether there would be some exchange rate manipulation in some countries. We look at this
issue in the next subsection.
4.7.2 Do competitiveness factors and institution factors play any role?
To shed light on this question of exchange rate manipulation, we add some new variables to our model.
In addition to the variables mentioned for model 1, in model 4—where we add institutional and exchange
rate variables—the role of productivity in each country is confirmed, and the model shows large contribu-
tions from institution variables. The exchange rate variables contribute to some extent to current account
variations.
In addition to these common factors, it is worth pointing out the contribution of country-specific
factors that are reflected in the fixed-effect components that remain labeled "Others" as above. How-
ever, as shown by Figure 4, this "Other" factor considerably decreases, suggesting that the newly added
variables represent a considerable part of country-specific factors that play an important role in the cur-
rent account prediction. It is noteworthy that the traditional determinants documented in the literature
to understand the current account dynamics may not capture very specific factors that are nevertheless
important to explain current account configuration. Focusing on the German surpluses, some important
points can be mentioned. Germany is known as one of the largest current account surplus holders, and
this country-specific variable needs to be further analyzed.
In the literature, ethics, vocational training, and consumer behavior, as well as the specificity of
the euro area, are mentioned to be part of the process that leads to current account surpluses in some
countries such as Germany (Coricelli et al., 2013; Weber, 1904; Rodriguez-Palenzuela and Dees, 2016).
Ethics have been mentioned by sociologists and economists to have a significant impact in protestant
countries. They argue that Protestantism is one of the key factors that contribute to these countries’ eco-
nomic prosperity (Weber, 1904; Arruñada Benito, 2010; Becker and Woessmann, 2009; Cantoni et al.,
2017). According to the authors, this factor leads to a culture of responsibility among policymakers and
risk aversion within households and among entrepreneurs. Households have behaviors that consider sav-
ing to be more valuable than spending in order to cope with eventual uncertainty. In the same way, some
entrepreneurs or multinationals, instead of investing considerably in their home country, prefer to invest
more abroad through foreign direct investments. As a consequence, investment in the home country is
less important (Figure 6 below in annexes shows the evolution of investment in percentage of GDP).
Other important factors come from the specificity of the industrial sector. Germany’s manufacturing
sector is a key driver of the surpluses by the high quality of its workforce and the repute of “Made in
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Germany” products. This development was not possible without some changes in the education system
such as the vocational training program. Through this program, the manufacturing sector has continu-
ally produced a less expensive and more highly qualified workforce. As a consequence, the non-price
competitiveness in German exports has also increased continually and contributes to the current account
position.
Moreover, when considering monetary policy of the euro zone, the current account surplus in Ger-
many may reflect to some extent the specificity of the EMU (Europe Monetary Union) functioning. The
original design of the Europe Monetary Union ignored correction and prevention mechanisms of current
account imbalances. This mechanism was implemented only in the post-crisis context in 2011. In this
context, the monetary policy of the ECB (European Central Bank) may appear as too accommodating for
countries such as Germany with respect to other countries with different characteristics, such as Spain or
Italy. In our empirical exercise, exchange rate factors (including misalignment measures) explain a large
share of the German surpluses, underlining the role of the exchange rate in Germany-specific factors.
These factors contribute to the high current account position in Germany than France, which are both
members of the EMU (Figure 5). Regarding this situation, it may be useful to address these issues by










Figure 4 – Contributions of fundamental variables to current account predictions (Model 4 of Table 3)
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Figure 5 – Exchange Rate Factors Contribution in the Current Account in Germany and France (in
percent)
5 Conclusion
Our paper sheds light on variables explaining the persistence of current account imbalances. Through
the decomposition of our sample between pre- and post-GFC and the dummy variable approach, we find
that current account dynamics differ not only across countries but also across time. However, assessing
the presence of structural breaks from the GFC, we have found that the GFC does not change the impact
of the determinants across the time. The determinants are structural and incorporate changes themselves
that the GFC could have brought. Including the role of financial development, currency misalignment,
financial openness, and institution quality variables, we have found that these variables are significant
factors impacting current accounts and that their impact passes through the changes in investment and
saving behaviors. We have also assessed the degree of uncertainty between our models and have found
that our models are consistent with each other in most cases, except for the U.S. Our predictions for
current accounts in selected countries underline the role of productivity, exchange rates, openness, and
demographic factors in the current account evolution. Concerning Germany, we have found that their
surplus is also explained by some factors that we do not consider in our specifications. We interpret
the German situation by the presence of key structural factors to explain the current account surpluses,
including sociological factors, such as ethics or saving behaviors by households. In the case of the
European Monetary Union, it may be useful to address the current account imbalances issues by im-
plementing a policy mix that accounts for such heterogeneity within the euro area members. Overall,
our findings help to better understand current account dynamics across time and countries and show the
importance of using factors that go beyond the traditional saving-investment determinants and account





VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 2.1 Model 3 Emerging Market Advanced Market
General_Gov_Structural_Balance 0.206** 0.210** 0.194** 0.218** 0.232** 0.148
(0.0887) (0.0892) (0.0914) (0.0889) (0.100) (0.113)
Lagnfa 0.544 0.513 0.581 0.551 0.139 -0.127
(0.973) (0.982) (1.011) (0.980) (1.452) (0.927)
GDP_percapita 0.170*** 0.169*** 0.173*** 0.168*** -0.428*** 0.241***
(0.0227) (0.0229) (0.0240) (0.0227) (0.148) (0.0373)
GDP_Growth -0.155*** -0.154*** -0.158*** -0.155*** -0.121** -0.165**
(0.0557) (0.0555) (0.0568) (0.0560) (0.0559) (0.0711)
Youth Age Ratio 0.0935** 0.0932** 0.0886** 0.0915** -0.148*** -0.0276
(0.0387) (0.0375) (0.0396) (0.0380) (0.0465) (0.157)
Old Age Ratio 0.0289 0.0288 0.00693 0.0284 -0.210* 0.300**
(0.0979) (0.0964) (0.0994) (0.0975) (0.126) (0.139)
REER -0.0106 -0.0102 -0.00750 -0.0105 -0.0311** 0.0228
(0.0162) (0.0158) (0.0165) (0.0161) (0.0152) (0.0255)
Trade Openness 0.00193 0.00223 0.00497 0.000582 -0.00942 0.0276**
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.00918) (0.0109) (0.0155) (0.0136)
Financial Openness -3.030** -3.011** -3.050** -3.122** 0.860 -1.784
(1.241) (1.223) (1.315) (1.224) (1.219) (2.263)
Financial Crisis 0.658 1.714*** 1.447 0.136
(0.450) (0.581) (1.430) (0.766)
Financial Crisis(t+1) -0.840*
(0.499)
FincrisisOpenness -0.0131 0.0258 -0.0157*
(0.00854) (0.0214) (0.00843)
Constant -3.499 -3.552 -3.630 -3.247 15.30*** -18.29**
(3.588) (3.541) (3.604) (3.621) (4.158) (7.708)
Observations 885 885 883 885 392 493
R-squared 0.185 0.187 0.193 0.187 0.169 0.352
Number of idcoun 56 56 56 56 25 31
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1 – Basic estimations
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6.2 Estimation before and after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008
6.2.1 The sample dividing approach
VARIABLES Before GFC After GFC EM before GFC EM After GFC AM Before GFC AM After GFC
General_Gov_Structural_Balance 0.0916 0.504*** 0.179 0.404*** 0.144 0.488***
(0.112) (0.105) (0.149) (0.135) (0.140) (0.120)
Lagnfa 3.393** 1.463* -0.578 6.960*** 5.683*** -0.669
(1.498) (0.784) (1.439) (1.681) (0.949) (0.883)
GDP_percapita 0.161*** 0.122*** -0.698*** 0.0106 0.207*** 0.203***
(0.0274) (0.0143) (0.205) (0.143) (0.0279) (0.0314)
GDP_Growth -0.0843* -0.143* -0.0264 -0.182** -0.186* -0.0760
(0.0480) (0.0744) (0.0496) (0.0762) (0.111) (0.0748)
Youth Age Ratio 0.0261 0.131*** -0.149** 0.0411 0.0185 -0.0774
(0.0270) (0.0323) (0.0627) (0.0453) (0.0797) (0.144)
Old Age Ratio -0.208** 0.217*** -0.162 0.0577 -0.0573 0.405***
(0.0847) (0.0716) (0.158) (0.171) (0.0912) (0.108)
REER -0.0438** 0.0564*** -0.0718*** 0.0245 -0.0117 0.0801***
(0.0192) (0.0167) (0.0182) (0.0216) (0.0263) (0.0296)
Trade Openness 0.00558 0.0159*** -0.0217 0.0238 0.000570 0.0366***
(0.00839) (0.00601) (0.0259) (0.0156) (0.00857) (0.0100)
Financial Openness -3.348*** -6.729*** 1.538 -4.147** -2.747* 1.249
(1.203) (1.388) (2.018) (1.924) (1.650) (3.838)
Financial Crisis -2.908 1.249 -0.148 2.003 -6.250* -1.239
(2.105) (1.729) (2.683) (2.392) (3.408) (1.980)
FincrisisOpenness 0.0787* -0.0128 0.0429 0.0165 0.138** -0.0139
(0.0417) (0.0194) (0.0549) (0.0318) (0.0619) (0.0187)
Constant 6.212*** -12.28*** 19.68*** -2.206 -2.456 -28.27***
(1.738) (3.042) (4.375) (4.390) (4.267) (6.811)
Observations 437 448 192 200 245 248
R-squared 0.302 0.400 0.232 0.365 0.586 0.581
Number of idcoun 56 56 25 25 31 31
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2 – Estimations before and after the 2008 GFC
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6.2.2 Dummy variable approach
VARIABLES General General with Year2007 General with Year2008 General with Year dummies
General_Gov_Structural_Balance 0.218** 0.235*** 0.203** 0.276***
(0.0889) (0.0874) (0.0798) (0.0812)
Lagnfa 0.551 0.685 0.366 0.402
(0.980) (0.974) (0.930) (0.935)
GDP_percapita 0.168*** 0.165*** 0.172*** 0.174***
(0.0227) (0.0222) (0.0215) (0.0221)
GDPgrowthannualNYGDPMK -0.155*** -0.158*** -0.148*** -0.142***
(0.0560) (0.0558) (0.0454) (0.0513)
Agedependencyratioyoungo 0.0915** 0.0919*** 0.0979*** 0.0870**
(0.0380) (0.0349) (0.0368) (0.0361)
Agedependencyratiooldof 0.0284 0.0233 0.0332 -0.00789
(0.0975) (0.0847) (0.0895) (0.0879)
REER -0.0105 -0.00872 -0.00210 0.00175
(0.0161) (0.0158) (0.0146) (0.0153)
openess 0.000582 0.00234 0.0113 0.0154
(0.0109) (0.0106) (0.00908) (0.00993)
ka_open -3.122** -3.200*** -3.026*** -2.916**
(1.224) (1.187) (1.145) (1.185)
wFinCris 1.714*** 1.691*** 1.041* 1.146*
(0.581) (0.630) (0.626) (0.672)
FincrisisOpness -0.0131 -0.0134 -0.0101 -0.0117



































Constant -3.247 -3.339 -5.622* -5.488
(3.621) (3.424) (3.199) (3.388)
Observations 885 885 885 885
R-squared 0.187 0.194 0.248 0.273
Number of idcoun 56 56 56 56
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3 – Estimations before and after the GFC(Dummy variable approach)
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6.2.3 Dummy variable approach

















































Number of idcoun 56 56
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4 – Estimations before and after the GFC(Dummy variable approach)
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6.3 General model taking into account exchange rate and institutional factors
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Fiscal Balance 0.214** 0.207** 0.211** 0.223*** 0.220***
(0.0894) (0.0858) (0.0862) (0.0848) (0.0842)
Lagnfa 0.475 0.777 0.104 0.0963 0.130
(0.969) (0.874) (0.908) (0.853) (0.850)
GDP_percapita 0.175*** 0.213*** 0.193*** 0.258*** 0.270***
(0.0222) (0.0314) (0.0314) (0.0349) (0.0367)
GDP_Growth -0.126** -0.126** -0.141** -0.149** -0.142**
(0.0567) (0.0564) (0.0589) (0.0585) (0.0573)
Youth Age Ratio 0.102** 0.0185 0.0556 0.0177 -0.0154
(0.0433) (0.0486) (0.0465) (0.0505) (0.0524)
Old Age Ratio 0.0406 -0.0164 0.00937 0.0261 -0.00794
(0.0984) (0.101) (0.0935) (0.0982) (0.101)
Trade Openness 0.00250 0.00120 0.00430 0.00665 0.00485
(0.0110) (0.0112) (0.0118) (0.0110) (0.0111)
Financial Openness -3.158*** -2.039* -3.335*** -2.982** -2.340*
(1.213) (1.186) (1.244) (1.201) (1.204)
Financial Crisis 1.642*** 1.825*** 1.631*** 1.982*** 1.909***
(0.562) (0.638) (0.599) (0.617) (0.622)
FincrisisOpenness -0.0125 -0.0142 -0.0103 -0.0145* -0.0142*
(0.00853) (0.00872) (0.00832) (0.00837) (0.00842)
FD -3.971* -1.249 -0.345 -1.414
(2.324) (2.232) (1.984) (2.109)
Mis_bar -4.993*** -11.18*** -11.43*** -10.59***
(1.744) (2.490) (2.373) (2.375)








InvestmentProfile -0.422*** -0.327** -0.286*
(0.159) (0.157) (0.156)
REER 0.0634*** 0.0700*** 0.0632***
(0.0187) (0.0171) (0.0169)
rtfpna -8.539* -6.067 -8.592* -7.288 -7.782*
(4.789) (4.693) (4.847) (4.625) (4.605)
InternalConflict -0.585*** -0.445***
(0.171) (0.151)
Constant 3.036 14.44** -1.089 4.728 10.61*
(5.587) (6.531) (5.658) (5.906) (6.393)
Observations 885 885 885 885 885
R-squared 0.193 0.222 0.221 0.261 0.264
Number of idcoun 56 56 56 56 56
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5 – Estimation of the general model taking into account exchange rate and institutional factors
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6.4 Robustness Model
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
L.CA_GDP 0.855*** 0.849*** 0.860*** 0.852*** 0.853***
(0.0414) (0.0397) (0.0448) (0.0406) (0.0410)
Fiscal Balance 0.185*** 0.139** 0.188*** 0.150** 0.146**
(0.0627) (0.0630) (0.0635) (0.0598) (0.0600)
Lagnfa -0.202 -0.194 -0.234 -0.331 -0.360
(0.249) (0.264) (0.248) (0.303) (0.311)
GDP_percapita 0.0165** 0.0235* 0.0152 0.0272* 0.0292*
(0.00769) (0.0124) (0.00911) (0.0147) (0.0157)
GDP_Growth -0.276*** -0.266*** -0.282*** -0.275*** -0.273***
(0.0619) (0.0626) (0.0618) (0.0634) (0.0632)
Youth Age Ratio 0.0144 0.000133 0.0133 0.0103 0.00440
(0.0156) (0.0187) (0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0179)
Old Age Ratio -0.0212 -0.0302 -0.0232 -0.0153 -0.0163
(0.0276) (0.0293) (0.0294) (0.0256) (0.0259)
Trade Openness 0.00313 0.00333 0.00369 0.00343 0.00384
(0.00222) (0.00209) (0.00227) (0.00228) (0.00233)
Financial Openness -0.511 0.133 -0.547 -0.0533 0.0400
(0.556) (0.640) (0.603) (0.669) (0.662)
Financial Crisis 3.051** 3.021** 1.634 3.050** 2.989**
(1.464) (1.447) (1.025) (1.454) (1.455)
FincrisisOpenness -0.0170 -0.0167 -0.0165 -0.0160
(0.0153) (0.0151) (0.0154) (0.0153)
FD -0.0870 0.378 0.0117
(0.897) (0.820) (0.839)










InvestmentProfile -0.155** -0.164** -0.137*
(0.0718) (0.0703) (0.0720)
REER 0.00666 0.0240* 0.0237*
(0.00897) (0.0122) (0.0121)
rtfpna -1.565 -1.453 -1.687 -2.009
(2.465) (2.494) (2.335) (2.375)
InternalConflict -0.113 -0.132
(0.110) (0.0970)
Constant 2.391 4.769 0.280 0.856 2.070
(3.070) (3.061) (1.362) (2.512) (2.605)
Observations 835 835 835 835 835
Number of idcoun 56 56 56 56 56
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6 – GMM model estimation
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6.5 Results of the General model (before and after the GFC)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES Model 1.a Model 1.b Model 2.a Model 2.b Model 3.a Model 3.b Model 4.a Model 4.b Model 5.a Model 5.b
Fiscal Balance 0.108 0.511*** 0.0977 0.468*** 0.0846 0.453*** 0.186** 0.417*** 0.179** 0.416***
(0.111) (0.107) (0.0869) (0.0963) (0.0934) (0.109) (0.0890) (0.102) (0.0888) (0.0998)
Lagnfa 3.697*** 1.753** 3.343*** 1.830** 3.080*** 0.901 3.750*** 0.982 3.550*** 0.942
(1.323) (0.789) (1.196) (0.726) (1.082) (0.776) (0.986) (0.821) (1.051) (0.810)
GDP_percapita 0.157*** 0.116*** 0.235*** 0.163*** 0.250*** 0.123*** 0.257*** 0.158*** 0.266*** 0.172***
(0.0242) (0.0145) (0.0266) (0.0277) (0.0245) (0.0241) (0.0269) (0.0382) (0.0270) (0.0384)
GDP_Growth -0.0172 -0.108 -0.0924 -0.0953 -0.0334 -0.125 -0.142** -0.109 -0.136** -0.112
(0.0459) (0.0762) (0.0651) (0.0771) (0.0526) (0.0791) (0.0680) (0.0787) (0.0668) (0.0769)
Youth Age Ratio 0.0758*** 0.134*** -0.125*** 0.0703 -0.0912* 0.0954** -0.0693 0.0760 -0.0980** 0.0497
(0.0252) (0.0316) (0.0477) (0.0495) (0.0525) (0.0403) (0.0509) (0.0529) (0.0487) (0.0584)
Old Age Ratio -0.0781 0.209*** -0.333*** 0.178** -0.430*** 0.244*** -0.292*** 0.196*** -0.304*** 0.191***
(0.0819) (0.0697) (0.104) (0.0773) (0.102) (0.0592) (0.107) (0.0672) (0.100) (0.0709)
Trade Openness 0.00618 0.0154** -0.00594 0.0135* 0.00646 0.0186** 0.00648 0.0194** 0.00171 0.0186**
(0.00774) (0.00695) (0.00911) (0.00767) (0.0102) (0.00845) (0.00908) (0.00824) (0.00898) (0.00836)
Financial Openness -4.284*** -5.992*** -1.442 -4.994*** -1.853 -6.676*** -1.252 -5.424*** -0.680 -5.143***
(1.202) (1.486) (1.209) (1.386) (1.278) (1.480) (1.396) (1.484) (1.284) (1.442)
Financial Crisis -3.824** 1.440 -1.682 1.461 -2.056 1.011 -2.308 1.509 -2.302 1.432
(1.903) (1.701) (1.659) (1.772) (1.699) (1.829) (1.613) (1.639) (1.581) (1.668)
FincrisisOpenness 0.0942** -0.0138 0.0568* -0.0164 0.0673* -0.0102 0.0680** -0.0168 0.0667** -0.0167
(0.0399) (0.0197) (0.0311) (0.0189) (0.0364) (0.0194) (0.0327) (0.0174) (0.0322) (0.0173)
rtfpna -13.96*** -6.210 -7.952*** -4.039 -12.62*** -11.01 -9.631*** -5.998 -9.473*** -6.581
(2.816) (9.476) (2.992) (8.725) (2.934) (9.732) (2.946) (9.026) (3.108) (8.892)
FD -10.54*** -2.583 -8.484*** 1.041 -7.411*** 2.532 -8.291*** 1.150
(2.366) (1.901) (2.130) (1.991) (2.406) (1.879) (2.424) (1.956)
Mis_bar -8.904*** -1.252 -12.57*** -9.235*** -11.12*** -9.199** -11.26*** -9.287**
(1.942) (2.204) (2.420) (3.585) (2.041) (3.607) (2.159) (3.664)
GovernmentStability -0.0614 -0.0544 0.0311 0.0998 0.0842 0.133
(0.101) (0.194) (0.116) (0.192) (0.117) (0.196)
REER 0.0633*** 0.117*** 0.0419*** 0.111*** 0.0403*** 0.111***
(0.0169) (0.0297) (0.0134) (0.0302) (0.0135) (0.0306)
Corruption -1.258*** -0.248 -1.272*** -0.226
(0.248) (0.303) (0.265) (0.306)
SocioeconomicConditions -0.336** -0.570** -0.273* -0.465*
(0.144) (0.251) (0.152) (0.269)
LawandOrder 0.360** 0.264 0.501** 0.241
(0.175) (0.373) (0.208) (0.362)
InvestmentProfile -0.397*** -0.436** -0.353*** -0.341* -0.333*** -0.339
(0.105) (0.205) (0.121) (0.205) (0.116) (0.206)
InternalConflict -0.422*** -0.537** -0.444*** -0.303
(0.161) (0.233) (0.160) (0.230)
Constant 12.14*** -0.292 27.57*** 9.185 17.14*** -7.545 19.98*** -7.151 24.08*** -3.426
(2.418) (8.993) (4.012) (9.768) (3.173) (7.972) (3.615) (9.311) (3.931) (8.944)
Observations 437 448 437 448 437 448 437 448 437 448
R-squared 0.320 0.390 0.320 0.418 0.434 0.423 0.410 0.415 0.377 0.424
Number of idcoun 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7 – General Model After and Before the GFC
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6.6 Robustness models Before and After the GFC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 1.1 Model 2 Model 2.1 Model 3 Model 3.1 Model 4 Model 4.1 Model 5 Model 5.1
L.CA_GDP 0.980*** 0.728*** 0.952*** 0.725*** 0.982*** 0.723*** 0.939*** 0.728*** 0.934*** 0.729***
(0.0797) (0.0654) (0.0816) (0.0649) (0.0805) (0.0661) (0.0735) (0.0673) (0.0748) (0.0685)
Fiscal Balance 0.164 0.202 0.127 0.154 0.151 0.226* 0.0567 0.156 0.0439 0.165
(0.0991) (0.132) (0.0863) (0.143) (0.0936) (0.132) (0.0975) (0.147) (0.0914) (0.148)
Lagnfa 0.375 -0.0567 0.477 -0.106 0.350 -0.166 0.622* -0.396 0.635* -0.497
(0.469) (0.280) (0.442) (0.333) (0.459) (0.272) (0.340) (0.359) (0.338) (0.362)
GDP_percapita 0.00319 0.0307** 0.00416 0.0433** 0.00239 0.0359** -0.00759 0.0517** -0.00497 0.0584**
(0.0106) (0.0143) (0.0161) (0.0189) (0.0111) (0.0156) (0.0189) (0.0206) (0.0198) (0.0228)
GDP_Growth -0.165 -0.290*** -0.172 -0.283*** -0.169 -0.284*** -0.169 -0.294*** -0.161 -0.297***
(0.107) (0.0654) (0.104) (0.0672) (0.107) (0.0737) (0.109) (0.0707) (0.107) (0.0705)
Youth Age Ratio 0.0110 0.0165 0.00830 -0.0104 0.0106 0.0171 0.0188 0.00146 0.0130 -0.0135
(0.0189) (0.0247) (0.0206) (0.0317) (0.0195) (0.0251) (0.0229) (0.0325) (0.0214) (0.0355)
Old Age Ratio -0.0392 -0.0113 -0.0336 -0.0259 -0.0415 -0.00339 -0.0214 -0.00157 -0.0261 -0.000862
(0.0408) (0.0387) (0.0445) (0.0394) (0.0403) (0.0393) (0.0423) (0.0415) (0.0433) (0.0422)
Trade Openness 0.00213 0.00209 0.00294 0.00272 0.00177 0.00367 0.00148 0.00448 0.00184 0.00546*
(0.00324) (0.00294) (0.00326) (0.00265) (0.00326) (0.00297) (0.00346) (0.00297) (0.00351) (0.00314)
Financial Openness -0.325 -0.506 -0.0517 0.275 -0.294 -0.849 -0.261 -0.124 -0.156 0.0255
(0.739) (0.904) (0.625) (1.008) (0.727) (0.890) (0.592) (0.968) (0.594) (0.935)
Financial Crisis -0.289 2.872* -0.0997 2.796* 4.021*** 1.070 0.0652 2.716* 0.0214 2.572
(2.179) (1.657) (2.278) (1.659) (1.395) (1.113) (2.367) (1.622) (2.334) (1.649)
FincrisisOpenness 0.0772** -0.0199 0.0701** -0.0191 0.0666** -0.0178 0.0672** -0.0166
(0.0297) (0.0165) (0.0298) (0.0166) (0.0299) (0.0166) (0.0294) (0.0169)
FD 0.867 -0.880 0.321 0.662 0.00138 -0.293
(0.960) (1.378) (1.079) (1.361) (1.110) (1.331)
Mis_bar -2.082 -1.703 -3.369** -4.101* -3.539** -4.062*
(1.519) (1.541) (1.611) (2.350) (1.584) (2.255)
GovernmentStability -0.0583 0.0388 -0.0369 0.0722
(0.108) (0.125) (0.115) (0.125)
Corruption 0.00965 -0.209 0.0172 -0.187
(0.203) (0.227) (0.198) (0.233)
SocioeconomicConditions 0.153 -0.0322 0.167 0.0442
(0.130) (0.172) (0.130) (0.162)
LawandOrder 0.162 -0.121 0.190 -0.188
(0.176) (0.211) (0.184) (0.204)
InvestmentProfile -0.124 -0.0961 -0.144 -0.157 -0.123 -0.0862
(0.156) (0.113) (0.151) (0.106) (0.152) (0.117)
REER -0.000323 0.0200 0.0174 0.0428* 0.0174 0.0420*
(0.0129) (0.0148) (0.0109) (0.0227) (0.0109) (0.0224)
rtfpna -0.117 3.265 -0.0409 3.481 -0.244 3.297 -0.444 2.226
(1.453) (7.073) (1.423) (7.464) (1.358) (7.762) (1.400) (7.792)
InternalConflict -0.0574 -0.273 -0.121 -0.308**
(0.103) (0.171) (0.115) (0.149)
Constant 1.323 -2.965 2.290 0.828 1.283 -1.930 -0.804 -6.045 0.169 -2.601
(2.117) (7.505) (2.745) (7.822) (1.780) (2.231) (2.195) (7.802) (2.438) (7.714)
Observations 387 448 387 448 387 448 387 448 387 448
Number of id 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8 – GMM Models After and Before the GFC
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6.7 Descriptive statistics General
VARIABLES N Mean Sd Min Max
CA_GDP 896 -0.607 5.805 -23.90 16.53
Fiscal Balance 885 -2.260 2.879 -18.71 7.717
GDP_Growth 896 3.150 3.500 -14.76 25.16
Financial Openness 896 0.739 0.327 0 1
Mis_bar 896 -0.0105 0.125 -0.359 0.334
Youth Age Ratio 896 32.43 12.35 14.87 83.64
Old Age Ratio 896 18.35 7.603 5.610 42.66
GDP_percapita 896 24,341 20,305 826.6 91,566
FD 896 0.533 0.226 0.0613 1
SocioeconomicConditions 896 7.184 2.015 2 11
InvestmentProfile 896 9.854 1.696 3 12
GovernmentStability 896 8.069 1.503 4.667 12
Corruption 896 3.312 1.269 1 6
LawandOrder 896 4.356 1.302 1 6
Trade Openness 896 87.28 52.77 19.80 442.6
rtfpna 896 0.988 0.0616 0.696 1.212
REER 896 99.37 12.85 57.41 160.1
Financial Crisis 896 -0.00475 0.149 -0.430 0.997
Lagnfa 896 -0.275 0.728 -6.610 3.483
Table 9 – Summary statistics General
27
6.7.1 Descriptive statistics Advanced Market
VARIABLES N Mean Sd Min Max
CA_GDP 496 -0.0675 6.312 -23.30 16.23
Fiscal Balance 493 -2.252 2.969 -18.71 5.346
GDP_Growth 496 2.260 3.317 -14.43 25.16
Financial Openness 496 0.921 0.183 0.166 1
Mis_bar 496 0.0214 0.101 -0.239 0.334
Youth Age Ratio 496 25.81 5.232 14.87 45.74
Old Age Ratio 496 23.05 5.088 9.953 42.66
GDP_percapita 496 38,565 16,753 6,960 91,566
FD 496 0.674 0.176 0.208 1
SocioeconomicConditions 496 8.432 1.428 4 11
InvestmentProfile 496 10.69 1.441 6.250 12
GovernmentStability 496 8.069 1.399 4.667 11.08
Corruption 496 4.082 1.081 2 6
LawandOrder 496 5.200 0.680 3 6
Trade Openness 496 96.28 61.96 19.80 442.6
rtfpna 496 0.996 0.0534 0.766 1.212
REER 496 98.11 11.30 63.22 151.5
Financial Crisis 496 0.00566 0.148 -0.430 0.982
Lagnfa 496 -0.199 0.924 -6.610 3.483
Table 10 – Summary statistics Advanced Market
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6.7.2 Descriptive statistics Emerging Market
VARIABLES N Mean Sd Min Max
CA_GDP 400 -1.275 5.035 -23.90 16.53
Fiscal Balance 392 -2.269 2.764 -10.95 7.717
GDP_Growth 400 4.255 3.408 -14.76 14.23
Financial Openness 400 0.513 0.325 0 1
Mis_bar 400 -0.0500 0.141 -0.359 0.288
Youth Age Ratio 400 40.64 13.63 19.46 83.64
Old Age Ratio 400 12.52 6.008 5.610 30.47
GDP_percapita 400 6,704 3,650 826.6 15,208
FD 400 0.358 0.145 0.0613 0.703
SocioeconomicConditions 400 5.636 1.495 2 10
InvestmentProfile 400 8.822 1.396 3 11.50
GovernmentStability 400 8.070 1.625 5 12
Corruption 400 2.358 0.716 1 5
LawandOrder 400 3.310 1.117 1 6
Trade Openness 400 76.11 35.47 22.11 220.4
rtfpna 400 0.980 0.0696 0.696 1.168
REER 400 100.9 14.40 57.41 160.1
Financial Crisis 400 -0.0176 0.149 -0.430 0.997
Lagnfa 400 -0.369 0.337 -2.149 0.305
Table 11 – Summary statistics Emerging Market
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6.8 Structural break tests
Linear regression
CA_GDP Coef. St.Err. t-value p-value [95% Conf Interval] Sig
Fiscal Balance 0.365 0.081 4.49 0.000 0.206 0.525 ***
Lagnfa 5.476 0.497 11.02 0.000 4.501 6.451 ***
GDP_percapita 0.126 0.016 7.71 0.000 0.094 0.158 ***
GDP_Growth -0.285 0.095 -2.99 0.003 -0.472 -0.098 ***
Youth Age Ratio 0.071 0.033 2.16 0.031 0.007 0.135 **
Old Age Ratio -0.107 0.073 -1.47 0.142 -0.249 0.036
REER -0.006 0.019 -0.32 0.752 -0.043 0.031
Trade Openness 0.013 0.005 2.42 0.016 0.002 0.024 **
Financial Openness -5.334 1.005 -5.31 0.000 -7.308 -3.361 ***
Financial Crisis -7.197 4.991 -1.44 0.150 -16.993 2.599
FincrisisOpenness 0.144 0.090 1.61 0.107 -0.031 0.320
d2 -9.851 4.107 -2.40 0.017 -17.912 -1.789 **
id1 0.268 0.115 2.33 0.020 0.042 0.494 **
id2 -3.695 0.568 -6.50 0.000 -4.810 -2.580 ***
id3 0.011 0.022 0.49 0.625 -0.032 0.053
id4 0.190 0.115 1.66 0.097 -0.035 0.415 *
id5 0.020 0.048 0.42 0.675 -0.074 0.114
id6 0.251 0.092 2.74 0.006 0.071 0.431 ***
id7 0.044 0.027 1.62 0.106 -0.009 0.097
id8 -0.003 0.007 -0.49 0.623 -0.017 0.010
id9 -0.746 1.397 -0.53 0.593 -3.487 1.995
id10 10.778 5.681 1.90 0.058 -0.371 21.928 *
id11 -0.193 0.093 -2.07 0.039 -0.376 -0.010 **




-0.602 SD dependent var 5.822
R-squared 0.433 Number of obs 885.000
F-test 28.539 Prob > F 0.000
Akaike crit.
(AIC)
5175.223 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 5290.077
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
( 1) d2 = 0
( 2) id1 = 0
( 3) id2 = 0
( 4) id3 = 0
( 5) id4 = 0
( 6) id5 = 0
( 7) id6 = 0
( 8) id7 = 0
( 9) id8 = 0
(10) id9 = 0
(11) id10 = 0
(12) id11 = 0
F( 12, 861) = 6.67
Prob > F = 0.0000
Table 12 – Chow Test1
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Linear regression
CA_GDP Coef. St.Err. t-value p-value [95% Conf Interval] Sig
Fiscal Balance 0.346 0.081 4.29 0.000 0.188 0.504 ***
Lagnfa 5.164 0.495 10.43 0.000 4.192 6.135 ***
GDP_percapita 0.139 0.017 8.28 0.000 0.106 0.172 ***
GDP_Growth -0.250 0.095 -2.63 0.009 -0.438 -0.063 ***
Youth Age Ratio 0.089 0.033 2.67 0.008 0.024 0.154 ***
Old Age Ratio -0.062 0.073 -0.85 0.397 -0.206 0.082
Trade Openness 0.012 0.005 2.28 0.023 0.002 0.023 **
Financial Openness -5.373 0.977 -5.50 0.000 -7.290 -3.457 ***
Financial Crisis -7.128 4.968 -1.44 0.152 -16.880 2.623
FincrisisOpenness 0.135 0.089 1.52 0.130 -0.040 0.309
rtfpna -9.605 3.119 -3.08 0.002 -15.728 -3.483 ***
d2 -11.530 8.395 -1.37 0.170 -28.008 4.948
id1 0.286 0.115 2.49 0.013 0.061 0.512 **
id2 -3.208 0.559 -5.73 0.000 -4.306 -2.110 ***
id3 -0.012 0.022 -0.54 0.592 -0.054 0.031
id4 0.181 0.117 1.54 0.123 -0.049 0.410
id5 0.001 0.048 0.02 0.984 -0.094 0.096
id6 0.202 0.093 2.18 0.029 0.020 0.384 **
id7 -0.004 0.007 -0.63 0.529 -0.018 0.009
id8 -0.219 1.355 -0.16 0.872 -2.878 2.441
id9 10.865 5.661 1.92 0.055 -0.246 21.976 *
id10 -0.183 0.093 -1.98 0.048 -0.365 -0.002 **
id11 8.366 8.310 1.01 0.314 -7.945 24.678




-0.602 SD dependent var 5.822
R-squared 0.436 Number of obs 885.000
F-test 28.965 Prob > F 0.000
Akaike crit.
(AIC)
5169.533 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 5284.387
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
( 1) d2 = 0
( 2) id1 = 0
( 3) id2 = 0
( 4) id3 = 0
( 5) id4 = 0
( 6) id5 = 0
( 7) id6 = 0
( 8) id7 = 0
( 9) id8 = 0
(10) id9 = 0
(11) id10 = 0
(12) id11 = 0
F( 12, 861) = 6.05
Prob > F = 0.0000
Table 13 – Chow Test2
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Linear regression
CA_GDP Coef. St.Err. t-value p-value [95% Conf Interval] Sig
Fiscal Balance 0.350 0.078 4.47 0.000 0.196 0.503 ***
Lagnfa 5.220 0.483 10.80 0.000 4.272 6.169 ***
GDP_percapita 0.172 0.021 8.05 0.000 0.130 0.214 ***
GDP_Growth -0.446 0.096 -4.65 0.000 -0.635 -0.258 ***
Youth Age Ratio -0.008 0.037 -0.21 0.834 -0.081 0.065
Old Age Ratio -0.107 0.075 -1.42 0.155 -0.254 0.040
Trade Openness 0.015 0.005 2.73 0.007 0.004 0.026 ***
Financial Openness -2.755 0.991 -2.78 0.006 -4.701 -0.810 ***
Financial Crisis -4.131 4.809 -0.86 0.391 -13.571 5.309
FincrisisOpenness 0.076 0.086 0.89 0.376 -0.093 0.245
rtfpna -3.428 3.147 -1.09 0.276 -9.606 2.750
FD -2.125 1.635 -1.30 0.194 -5.333 1.083
Mis_bar -10.298 2.055 -5.01 0.000 -14.332 -6.263 ***
InvestmentProfile -1.021 0.194 -5.25 0.000 -1.402 -0.639 ***
InternalConflict -0.425 0.178 -2.40 0.017 -0.774 -0.077 **
d2 -19.662 9.087 -2.16 0.031 -37.498 -1.827 **
id1 0.280 0.111 2.51 0.012 0.061 0.499 **
id2 -3.267 0.552 -5.91 0.000 -4.351 -2.182 ***
id3 -0.035 0.029 -1.20 0.229 -0.092 0.022
id4 0.377 0.116 3.24 0.001 0.149 0.604 ***
id5 0.086 0.054 1.61 0.108 -0.019 0.191
id6 0.224 0.093 2.40 0.016 0.041 0.408 **
id7 -0.006 0.007 -0.81 0.420 -0.019 0.008
id8 -1.837 1.428 -1.29 0.199 -4.641 0.966
id9 7.832 5.476 1.43 0.153 -2.916 18.580
id10 -0.125 0.090 -1.40 0.163 -0.301 0.051
id11 3.248 8.189 0.40 0.692 -12.825 19.322
id12 2.827 2.377 1.19 0.235 -1.838 7.493
id13 10.459 2.709 3.86 0.000 5.143 15.775 ***
id14 0.700 0.264 2.65 0.008 0.182 1.218 ***
id15 0.214 0.279 0.76 0.445 -0.335 0.762




-0.602 SD dependent var 5.822
R-squared 0.483 Number of obs 885.000
F-test 25.742 Prob > F 0.000
Akaike crit.
(AIC)
5108.284 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 5261.423
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
( 1) d2 = 0
( 2) id1 = 0
( 3) id2 = 0
( 4) id3 = 0
( 5) id4 = 0
( 6) id5 = 0
( 7) id6 = 0
( 8) id7 = 0
( 9) id8 = 0
(10) id9 = 0
(11) id10 = 0
(12) id11 = 0
(13) id12 = 0
(14) id13 = 0
(15) id14 = 0
(16) id15 = 0
F( 16, 853) = 6.32
Prob > F = 0.0000
Table 14 – Chow Test3
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Linear regression
CA_GDP Coef. St.Err. t-value p-value [95% Conf Interval] Sig
Fiscal Balance 0.354 0.080 4.40 0.000 0.196 0.511 ***
Lagnfa 5.165 0.495 10.43 0.000 4.194 6.137 ***
GDP_percapita 0.159 0.021 7.59 0.000 0.118 0.201 ***
GDP_Growth -0.339 0.094 -3.60 0.000 -0.524 -0.154 ***
Youth Age Ratio 0.016 0.037 0.44 0.661 -0.056 0.088
Old Age Ratio -0.099 0.076 -1.30 0.195 -0.248 0.051
Trade Openness 0.006 0.005 1.11 0.266 -0.005 0.017
Financial Openness -5.221 1.014 -5.15 0.000 -7.212 -3.230 ***
Financial Crisis -5.983 4.864 -1.23 0.219 -15.530 3.563
FincrisisOpenness 0.112 0.087 1.29 0.199 -0.059 0.284
rtfpna -7.574 3.088 -2.45 0.014 -13.634 -1.514 **
FD -2.427 1.651 -1.47 0.142 -5.667 0.812
Mis_bar -16.475 2.530 -6.51 0.000 -21.442 -11.509 ***
GovernmentStability -0.174 0.155 -1.13 0.261 -0.478 0.130
REER 0.084 0.023 3.68 0.000 0.039 0.129 ***
d2 -11.197 9.070 -1.23 0.217 -29.000 6.606
id1 0.283 0.114 2.49 0.013 0.060 0.506 **
id2 -3.563 0.583 -6.12 0.000 -4.706 -2.420 ***
id3 -0.032 0.028 -1.15 0.252 -0.087 0.023
id4 0.244 0.116 2.11 0.036 0.017 0.471 **
id5 0.070 0.053 1.33 0.186 -0.034 0.174
id6 0.240 0.096 2.50 0.013 0.052 0.428 **
id7 0.004 0.007 0.58 0.560 -0.010 0.018
id8 -0.634 1.406 -0.45 0.652 -3.393 2.126
id9 9.649 5.549 1.74 0.082 -1.242 20.540 *
id10 -0.161 0.091 -1.76 0.078 -0.339 0.018 *
id11 5.369 8.200 0.66 0.513 -10.725 21.463
id12 3.978 2.349 1.69 0.091 -0.632 8.588 *
id13 14.227 3.260 4.36 0.000 7.828 20.627 ***
id14 -0.027 0.238 -0.11 0.910 -0.494 0.440
id15 -0.029 0.032 -0.89 0.375 -0.092 0.035




-0.602 SD dependent var 5.822
R-squared 0.469 Number of obs 885.000
F-test 24.320 Prob > F 0.000
Akaike crit.
(AIC)
5132.228 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 5285.366
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
( 1) d2 = 0
( 2) id1 = 0
( 3) id2 = 0
( 4) id3 = 0
( 5) id4 = 0
( 6) id5 = 0
( 7) id6 = 0
( 8) id7 = 0
( 9) id8 = 0
(10) id9 = 0
(11) id10 = 0
(12) id11 = 0
(13) id12 = 0
(14) id13 = 0
(15) id14 = 0
(16) id15 = 0
F( 16, 853) = 6.45
Prob > F = 0.0000
Table 15 – Chow Test4
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Linear regression
CA_GDP Coef. St.Err. t-value p-value [95% Conf Interval] Sig
Fiscal Balance 0.446 0.082 5.46 0.000 0.286 0.606 ***
Lagnfa 5.059 0.515 9.82 0.000 4.048 6.069 ***
GDP_percapita 0.175 0.025 6.89 0.000 0.125 0.225 ***
GDP_Growth -0.521 0.098 -5.34 0.000 -0.712 -0.329 ***
Youth Age Ratio 0.023 0.038 0.60 0.548 -0.052 0.098
Old Age Ratio -0.054 0.078 -0.70 0.484 -0.207 0.098
Trade Openness 0.012 0.006 2.18 0.030 0.001 0.023 **
Financial Openness -3.772 1.039 -3.63 0.000 -5.812 -1.733 ***
Financial Crisis -4.111 4.760 -0.86 0.388 -13.454 5.231
FincrisisOpenness 0.086 0.085 1.01 0.312 -0.081 0.254
rtfpna -3.533 3.127 -1.13 0.259 -9.670 2.605
FD -0.728 1.718 -0.42 0.672 -4.100 2.645
Mis_bar -14.525 2.492 -5.83 0.000 -19.417 -9.633 ***
GovernmentStability -0.225 0.157 -1.43 0.153 -0.534 0.083
REER 0.071 0.023 3.09 0.002 0.026 0.115 ***
Corruption -0.742 0.279 -2.66 0.008 -1.289 -0.195 ***
SocioeconomicCond 0.027 0.202 0.13 0.896 -0.371 0.424
LawandOrder 0.291 0.281 1.04 0.300 -0.260 0.842
InvestmentProfile -1.075 0.195 -5.51 0.000 -1.458 -0.692 ***
d2 -18.875 9.122 -2.07 0.039 -36.779 -0.971 **
id1 0.197 0.115 1.72 0.085 -0.028 0.422 *
id2 -3.484 0.602 -5.79 0.000 -4.666 -2.302 ***
id3 -0.035 0.035 -0.99 0.322 -0.104 0.034
id4 0.422 0.118 3.59 0.000 0.191 0.652 ***
id5 0.092 0.055 1.66 0.097 -0.017 0.200 *
id6 0.224 0.097 2.30 0.022 0.033 0.415 **
id7 -0.002 0.007 -0.21 0.830 -0.016 0.013
id8 -1.383 1.460 -0.95 0.344 -4.249 1.483
id9 7.470 5.429 1.38 0.169 -3.185 18.125
id10 -0.131 0.089 -1.48 0.140 -0.306 0.043
id11 1.286 8.098 0.16 0.874 -14.608 17.180
id12 2.205 2.429 0.91 0.364 -2.562 6.972
id13 12.272 3.229 3.80 0.000 5.934 18.610 ***
id14 0.157 0.244 0.65 0.518 -0.321 0.635
id15 -0.015 0.032 -0.46 0.643 -0.078 0.048
id16 0.002 0.430 0.00 0.997 -0.841 0.845
id17 0.402 0.300 1.34 0.181 -0.187 0.991
id18 -0.167 0.420 -0.40 0.692 -0.992 0.658
id19 0.704 0.265 2.66 0.008 0.184 1.224 ***




-0.602 SD dependent var 5.822
R-squared 0.501 Number of obs 885.000
F-test 21.757 Prob > F 0.000
Akaike crit.
(AIC)
5093.430 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 5284.853
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
( 1) d2 = 0
( 2) id1 = 0
( 3) id2 = 0
( 4) id3 = 0
( 5) id4 = 0
( 6) id5 = 0
( 7) id6 = 0
( 8) id7 = 0
( 9) id8 = 0
(10) id9 = 0
(11) id10 = 0
(12) id11 = 0
(13) id12 = 0
(14) id13 = 0
(15) id14 = 0
(16) id15 = 0
(17) id16 = 0
(18) id17 = 0
(19) id18 = 0
(20) id19 = 0
F( 20, 845) = 5.46
Prob > F = 0.0000
Table 16 – Chow Test5
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Linear regression
CA_GDP Coef. St.Err. t-value p-value [95% Conf Interval] Sig
Fiscal Balance 0.443 0.081 5.45 0.000 0.284 0.603 ***
Lagnfa 5.045 0.513 9.83 0.000 4.038 6.052 ***
GDP_percapita 0.181 0.025 7.12 0.000 0.131 0.231 ***
GDP_Growth -0.503 0.097 -5.17 0.000 -0.695 -0.312 ***
Youth Age Ratio 0.003 0.039 0.08 0.933 -0.073 0.080
Old Age Ratio -0.065 0.078 -0.84 0.403 -0.217 0.087
Trade Openness 0.013 0.006 2.40 0.017 0.002 0.024 **
Financial Openness -3.419 1.045 -3.27 0.001 -5.470 -1.368 ***
Financial Crisis -4.613 4.747 -0.97 0.331 -13.930 4.705
FincrisisOpenness 0.096 0.085 1.12 0.262 -0.072 0.263
rtfpna -3.958 3.120 -1.27 0.205 -10.083 2.166
FD -1.906 1.776 -1.07 0.283 -5.393 1.580
Mis_bar -14.987 2.490 -6.02 0.000 -19.874 -10.099 ***
GovernmentStability -0.152 0.159 -0.96 0.339 -0.465 0.160
REER 0.071 0.023 3.14 0.002 0.027 0.116 ***
Corruption -0.729 0.278 -2.63 0.009 -1.274 -0.184 ***
SocioeconomicCond 0.078 0.203 0.39 0.700 -0.320 0.476
LawandOrder 0.440 0.286 1.54 0.124 -0.121 1.002
InvestmentProfile -0.990 0.197 -5.01 0.000 -1.377 -0.602 ***
InternalConflict -0.467 0.188 -2.49 0.013 -0.835 -0.099 **
d2 -18.031 9.657 -1.87 0.062 -36.985 0.923 *
id1 0.199 0.114 1.74 0.082 -0.025 0.423 *
id2 -3.585 0.606 -5.92 0.000 -4.774 -2.396 ***
id3 -0.034 0.035 -0.95 0.342 -0.103 0.036
id4 0.400 0.117 3.40 0.001 0.169 0.630 ***
id5 0.096 0.057 1.70 0.090 -0.015 0.207 *
id6 0.237 0.097 2.44 0.015 0.046 0.428 **
id7 -0.001 0.007 -0.19 0.848 -0.016 0.013
id8 -1.601 1.465 -1.09 0.275 -4.477 1.275
id9 7.632 5.418 1.41 0.159 -3.003 18.267
id10 -0.138 0.089 -1.55 0.121 -0.312 0.036
id11 -0.177 8.184 -0.02 0.983 -16.240 15.885
id12 2.343 2.576 0.91 0.363 -2.714 7.400
id13 12.659 3.223 3.93 0.000 6.332 18.986 ***
id14 0.126 0.246 0.51 0.609 -0.357 0.609
id15 -0.016 0.032 -0.50 0.617 -0.079 0.047
id16 0.025 0.429 0.06 0.954 -0.817 0.866
id17 0.439 0.306 1.43 0.152 -0.163 1.040
id18 -0.409 0.428 -0.95 0.340 -1.250 0.432
id19 0.692 0.271 2.55 0.011 0.160 1.225 **
id20 0.149 0.295 0.51 0.613 -0.430 0.729




-0.602 SD dependent var 5.822
R-squared 0.506 Number of obs 885.000
F-test 21.045 Prob > F 0.000
Akaike crit.
(AIC)
5088.930 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 5289.925
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
( 1) d2 = 0
( 2) id1 = 0
( 3) id2 = 0
( 4) id3 = 0
( 5) id4 = 0
( 6) id5 = 0
( 7) id6 = 0
( 8) id7 = 0
( 9) id8 = 0
(10) id9 = 0
(11) id10 = 0
(12) id11 = 0
(13) id12 = 0
(14) id13 = 0
(15) id14 = 0
(16) id15 = 0
(17) id16 = 0
(18) id17 = 0
(19) id18 = 0
(20) id19 = 0
(21) id20 = 0
F( 21, 843) = 5.42
Prob > F = 0.0000
Table 17 – Chow Test6
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GDP_percapita -0.3364447 0.0894799 -0.4259246 0.0721303
GDP_Growth -0.1048169 -0.1661256 0.0613088 0.0098154
Youth Age Ratio 0.1394425 0.1670231 -0.0275807 0.0326653
Old Age Ratio 0.5749898 0.2307472 0.3442425 0.0636085
REER 0.0091896 0.0012671 0.0079225 0.0057788
Trade Openness 0.0266145 0.0255897 0.0010248 0.0079292
Financial Openness -1.764377 -3.524842 1.760466 0.5278339
Hausman (1978) specification test
Coef.
Chi-square test value 117.968
P-value 0.0000
Table 18 – Hausman Test
Regression results
CA_GDP Coef. St.Err. t-value p-value [95% Conf Interval] Sig
Fiscal Balance 0.317 0.060 5.28 0.000 0.199 0.435 ***
Lagnfa -1.630 0.300 -5.43 0.000 -2.220 -1.040 ***
GDP_percapita -0.336 0.071 -4.73 0.000 -0.476 -0.197 ***
GDP_Growth -0.105 0.039 -2.71 0.007 -0.181 -0.029 ***
Youth Age Ratio 0.139 0.044 3.15 0.002 0.053 0.226 ***
Old Age Ratio 0.575 0.084 6.85 0.000 0.410 0.740 ***
REER 0.009 0.012 0.77 0.441 -0.014 0.033
Trade Openness 0.027 0.009 2.87 0.004 0.008 0.045 ***
Financial Openness -1.764 0.986 -1.79 0.074 -3.701 0.172 *
Constant -8.748 2.881 -3.04 0.002 -14.403 -3.092 ***
Mean dependent var -0.602 SD dependent var 5.822
R-squared 0.175 Number of obs 885.000
F-test 19.351 Prob > F 0.000
Akaike crit. (AIC) 4517.130 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 4564.986
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Pesaran’s test of cross-sectional independence = 5.752, Pr = 0.0000
Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements = 0.380
Table 19 – Cross-Sectional Dependence
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Regression results
CA_GDP Coef. St.Err. t-value p-value [95% Conf Interval] Sig
Fiscal Balance 0.125 0.061 2.04 0.042 0.005 0.245 **
Lagnfa -1.946 0.464 -4.19 0.000 -2.858 -1.035 ***
GDP_percapita 0.000 0.000 -0.52 0.602 0.000 0.000
GDP_Growth -0.090 0.032 -2.84 0.005 -0.153 -0.028 ***
Youth Age Ratio 0.350 0.122 2.88 0.004 0.111 0.589 ***
Old Age Ratio 0.835 0.160 5.21 0.000 0.521 1.150 ***
REER -0.036 0.016 -2.20 0.028 -0.068 -0.004 **
Trade Openness -0.057 0.015 -3.92 0.000 -0.086 -0.029 ***
Financial Openness -0.435 1.386 -0.31 0.754 -3.156 2.287
Constant -16.730 1.857 -9.01 0.000 -20.375 -13.085 ***
Mean dependent var -0.602 SD dependent var 5.822
Overall r-squared 0.059 Number of obs 829.000
F-test 9.609 Prob > F 0.000
Akaike crit. (AIC) 3762.092 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 3809.295
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
F test that all u_i=0: F(55,764) = 4.10 Prob > F = 0.0000
modified Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson = .69529204
Baltagi-Wu LBI = .84255353
Table 20 – Autocorrelation test
37
Figure 6 – Investment in some countries (source: IMF and IFO Institute)
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